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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
MODIFYING FEDERAL STANDARDS TO REFLECT
PRINCIPLES OF STATE LAW: THE NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT'S EXAMINATION OF THE
HICKS RATIONALE PROMPTS THE COURT TO CUSTOMIZE
ITS OWN STANDARD TO REVIEW STATE-BASED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,
503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993)
I. FACTS
Jocelyn Martin had been employed by the Provident Life Insurance
Company (Provident Life) for approximately 16 years1 when her employ-
ment was terminated as part of a massive reorganization of Provident Life
by its parent company, United Services Life Insurance Company.2  Mar-
tin filed suit against Provident Life, claiming that Provident Life had ter-
minated her because of her gender in violation of the Human Rights Act
of North Dakota.3 The district court, applying the McDonnell Douglas
standard,4 found that Provident Life was not motivated by discriminatory
reasons and therefore ruled in favor of Provident Life.5 Martin appealed
1. Brief for Appellee at 1, Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993)
(No. 920350).
2. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 226 (N.D. 1993). Jocelyn Martin's
co-worker, Phyllis Schweigert, was also terminated by Provident Life. Brief for Appellant at 1,
Schweigert v. Provident lie Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993) (No. 920350). Schweigert joined
Martin in the original sex discrimination action and also alleged a separate claim of age
discrimination. Id. Schweigert, however, did not appeal the district court's decision in favor of
Provident life. Id.
3. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 226. The Human Rights Act of North Dakota is codified in
chapter 14-02.4 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CETrr. CODE Ch. 14-02.4 (1991); see also
1983 N.D. Laws 173 (Human Rights Act); State Bar Association of North Dakota, The North Dakota
Human Rights Act and You 1 (1985) [hereinafter SBAND] (referring to ch. 14-02.4 as the Human
Rights Act of North Dakota). The Act provides that
[i]t is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, the presence of any mental or physical disability, status with
regard to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity off the
employer's premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the
essential business-related interests of the employer ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (Supp. 1993).
4. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229. The McDonnell Douglas standard was created in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green to review intentional discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). The court, in Schweigert, refers to the
McDonnell Douglas standard as the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine standard. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d
at 229. However, this Case Comment will follow the United States Supreme Court's language and
not include Burdine when mentioning the McDonnell Douglas framework. See St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (labelling the disparate treatment standard without
mentioning Burdine). See also infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text (explaining the McDonnell
Douglas standard).
5. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 226.
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the district court's ruling and claimed that the district court's finding was
clearly erroneous.6
On appeal, Martin argued that Provident Life's discriminatory moti-
vation for terminating her was evidenced by the method Provident Life
used to terminate her,7 the higher rate of severance pay that Provident
Life paid to the male employees that were terminated,' and the fact that
her responsibilities were assigned to a male employee who had not been
employed by Provident Life as long as Martin.' On review, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the McDonnell Douglas standard, which
the trial court used to analyze Martin's claim, was partially inconsistent
with state evidentiary principles.10
Under McDonnell Douglas, the presumption of discrimination,
which is created when a plaintiff satisfies a prima facie case, shifts only
the burden of production." Conversely, Rule 301 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence mandates that presumptions have the effect of shifting
the burden of persuasion.2 Accordingly, the supreme court announced a
new standard for analyzing claims pursuant to the Human Rights Act of
North Dakota. 13 The new standard increases an employer's burden in an
employment discrimination case by shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer to disprove discriminatory intent.' 4 Applying the new stan-
dard, the supreme court ruled that Provident Life had sufficiently satis-
fied its burden of proving that it had not discriminated against Martin,
and thus affirmed the district court's finding.'"
6. Id. at 230.
7. Id. Martin claimed that she and other female employees were "brusque[ly]" informed of
their termination and were only given ten-days notice before their employment ended. Id. Martin
claimed that higher ranking male employees were more respectfully informed of their terminations
and were given more than ten-days notice with the option of retiring early. Id. The district court
held that the difference in treatment was because of the "insensitivity of the officer" that terminated
Martin and not because of the company's discriminatory motives. Id. at 230-31.
8. Id. at 231. Martin showed that women who were terminated received -one week's severance
pay for each year of service... [while] the discharged men were paid at the rate of one and one-half
week's for each year of service." Id. The district cout reconciled this difference by finding that the
discharged men were 'elected officers" of the company and the discharged women were not. Id.
The district court concluded that the difference in severance pay was based on a "gender-neutral
policy which awarded extra severance pay to elected officers." Id.
9. Id. at 231. The district court found that Provident Life favored the male employee over
Martin because the male employee was better able to perform all of the necessary functions and not
because of Martin's gender. Id.
10. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
11. Id. at 228; see infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (explaining the three stages of the
McDonnell Douglas standard).
12. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 228-29. For the text of Rule 301, see infra note 80.
13. Id. at 229.
14. Id.




A. TITLE VII AND THE McDoNNELL DouGLAs STANDARD
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 restricts employment dis-
crimination which is based on race, color, religion, sex, and national ori-
gin.16 Enforcement of this Act is largely dependent on two types of civil
claims that allow a plaintiff to sue an employer for proscribed employ-
ment discrimination. 17 The two types of claims are called "disparate
impact" and "disparate treatment."' 8 This comment will focus primarily
on disparate treatment because it is the only type of claim that was
asserted in Schweigert.19
Disparate treatment involves an employer's intentional mistreatment
of an employee (or applicant) because of that person's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.20 The focus in a disparate treatment claim is
on proving the employer's discriminatory intent.2 ' Historically, plaintiffs
have struggled to satisfy this burden because intent is a mental process
and there is seldom direct evidence of a person's mental process.22
The United States Supreme Court recognized the plaintiff's difficulty
in producing direct evidence to link a discriminatory intent with an
employment practice.2 3 The Court, therefore, in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green,' established the McDonnell Douglas standard to enable a plaintiff
to use circumstantial evidence to prove an employer's discriminatory
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
17. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
18. Id.
19. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.w.2d 225, 229 (N.D. 1993). Disparate impact
occurs when an employer uses a "facially neutral" practice that unintentionally affects a protected
group "more harshly" than nongroup members. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). The focus in a disparate impact claim is on the actual consequences or
impact of the employment practice regardless of what the employer intended. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously reviewed a claim of disparate impact, but has
rejected that claim without extensive analysis. See Kent v. Sawyer Public School Dist. 16, 484
N.W.2d 287, 290-91 (N.D. 1992) (finding that the plaintiff's claim of disparate impact was not
supported by sufficient evidence).
Other types of claims that are used to enforce Title VII are retaliation, constructive discharge,
present effects of past discrimination, and religious discrimination. RICHEY, supra note 19, at A-12 to
A-17.
20. C. RICHEY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
& CIVIL RIcHTs ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL CoUwrs A-i (Jan. 1988 ed.); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e-
2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (listing the protected characteristics and the prohibited treatment
covered by the Act).
21. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991), revd, 970 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
22. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). "Direct
evidence is evidence which, if believed," proves a fact at issue without additional proof or inferences.
1 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 at 777 (4th ed. 1992).
23. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (recognizing the subtleness of
discriminatory practices).
24. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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intent.2 The McDonnell Douglas standard, as it was subsequently char-
acterized by the Court in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 6
is a three-stage analytical formula that directs the sequence and nature of
the burdens of proof for both parties in a disparate-treatment action.2 7
In stage I, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.' This involves showing that: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a pro-
tected group, 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for an available
position, 3) the plaintiff did not receive the position, and 4) the employer
proceeded to search for applicants with qualifications similar to those of
the plaintiff.29 By proving these elements which establish a prima facie
case, the plaintiff creates a presumption that the employer's reasons for its
employment action were discriminatory.3°
In stage II, with the prima facie case already established, the burden
of production shifts to the employer and requires him or her to rebut the
presumption of discriminatory intent by articulating a nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment action.3 ' This articulation must be established
with admissible evidence3 2 and must clearly explain the employer's non-
25. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981). Circumstantial
evidence is evidence of an indirect fact that requires an additional inference to prove the fact in
question. STRONG Er AL., supra note 22, at 777.
26. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
27. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
28. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
29. Id. The prima facie case is the "plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit
the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7 (citing 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940)). The difficulty of proving a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas formula is not considered to be an "onerous" task. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. However, "in
other contexts, a prima facie case only requiresproduction of enough evidence to raise an issue for
the trier of fact," whereas under the McDonnell Douglas formula, "the plaintiff... [must] actually
establish[ ] the elements of the prima fade case.., by a preponderance of the evidence." St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2757 (1993)(Souter, J., dissenting).
30. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983). The most
common reason "for the creation of presumptions is probability .... [J]udges have believed that
proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and
timesaving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." 2 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET
AL-, ED., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 454-55 (4th ed. 1992). Under McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff "eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection"-that
there was no position available for the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was not qualified. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 253-54. With the most common nondiscriminatory reasons eliminated, the Court presumes
that the plaintiff was discriminated against. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978). In Furnco, the Court stated:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only
because .... we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in
a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.
Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who
we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.
I& (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See infra note 94 (explaining and comparing the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion).
32. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. The burden of production, therefore, cannot be met with "an
answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.- Id. at 255 n.9.
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discriminatory reasons for its actions.3a If the employer is unable to rebut
the presumption, the presumption compels the factfinder to conclude
that the employer was motivated by discriminatory reasons.34 Should the
employer adequately produce a nondiscriminatory reason for its employ-
ment decision, the presumption is rebutted, and the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry advances to stage III, where the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff.35 The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. 6
Until recently, the federal circuits were divided over the extent of
the plaintiffs burden during the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
standard.37  Some circuits ruled that a plaintiff could satisfy his or her
burden by proving either that the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by
the employer was false or that the true reason for the adverse treatment
was discriminatory.35 Other circuits required a plaintiff to prove both that
the reason proffered by the defendant was false and that the true reason
was discriminatory.39
Even with its "unsettled" third stage, the McDonnell Douglas
formula's ability to focus the circumstantial evidence and "elusive" facts
40
that accompany claims of employment discrimination caused it to "gain[ ]
wide acceptance" among both federal41 and state4 courts to analyze non-
Title VII based employment discrimination claims.
33. Id. at 255. The purpse of the "clarity" requirement is "to [frame] the factual issue... so
that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext [in stage III]." Id. at 255-
56.
34. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
35. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
36. Id.
37. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at, 2750 (reviewing the different interpretations among the federal
circuits of the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas standard).
38. See, e.g., Fite v. First Tennessee Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 890-91 (6th Cir. 1988)
(allowing the plaintiff to only discredit the employer's proffered reasons for its employment action).
39. See, e.g., Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reyolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990)
(requiring a plaintiff to both discredit the emp oyer's proffered reason and prove that the true reason
was discriminatory); see also Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750 (reviewing the different circuits' interpretations
of the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas standard).
40. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
41. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Halsell v. Kimberty-Clark Corp., 683
F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983) (employing the McDonnell Douglas
standard to analyze claims brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
42. See Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Minn. 1986) (establishing the
McDonnell Douglas standard for state employment discrimination claims in Minnesota); Mixon v.
Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n., 192 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1317 (1987) (recognizing the
McDonnell Douglas standard as the proper standard for state discrimination claims in California);
Puetz Motor Sales Inc. v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 376 N.W.2d 372,374 (W'is. App. 1985)
(recognizing the McDonnell Douglas standard as the proper standard for state discrimination claims
in Wisconsin).
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B. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF NORTH DAKOTA: McDoNNELL
DOUGLAS STANDARD ADOPTED TO REVIEW STATE-BASED
DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS IN MOSES V
BuBLEzIH COUNTY
Most states have enacted employment discrimination statutes pat-
terned after federal civil rights laws.43 The Human Rights Act of North
Dakota was enacted to "complement" federal antidiscrimination laws and
to create a state remedy for victims of employment discrimination.' The
Act authorizes the North Dakota Supreme Court to develop the proper
procedures for making determinations of liability.'
The North Dakota Supreme Court first reviewed an employment
discrimination claim under the Act in Moses v. Burleigh County.' In
Moses, a sheriffs deputy sued the sheriff of Burleigh County alleging race
and sex discrimination. 47 In reversing and remanding the trial court's dis-
missal of Moses' claim, the supreme court used language that suggested
its adoption of the McDonnell Douglas standard. 8
The supreme court ordered the trial court to require the defendant
"to show a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason" for its employment
practice and to then provide the plaintiff an opportunity to show the
"claimed reason was in fact a pretext."49 The majority's apparent adop-
tion of the McDonnell Douglas standard 5° prompted a debate between
Justices VandeWalle and Levine over the suitability of using the federal
standard to review state-based claims.51
43. RICHEY, supra note 20, at H-1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the most
comprehensive protection for workers against proscribed discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2000e(17) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (providing protection for classes of workers based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin). Addionally, other federal acts provide other types of protection for
workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (Equal Pay Act of 1963) (proscribing salary discrimination on
the basis of gender); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967) (proscribing employment discrimination on the basis of age).
44. SBAND, supra note 3, at 1-2.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-20 (1991).
46. 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989). Although other employment discrimination claims reached
the supreme court prior to Moses, those claims were rejected without extensive analysis. See, e.g.,
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987) (ruling that the plaintiff
failed to show that she was a member of a protected class under the statute's definition); Hillesland v.
Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 215 (N.D. 1987) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to
meet his prima facie case of age discrimination).
47. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 187 (N.D. 1989).
48. Id. at 189 n.3.
49. Id. at 191-92.
50. Id. at 189 n.3. The majority only mentioned the McDonnell Douglas standard by name in its
recognition of Moses' argument in favor of using the standard. Id.
51. See id. at 194-97 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
use of the McDonnell Douglas standard tor state employment discrimination claims) and (Levine, J.,
oncurrng in part and dissenting in part) (supporting the majority's use of McDonnell Douglas in
Moses and advocating its use in future state employment discrimination claims).
212
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Justice VandeWalle objected to the majority's apparent endorsement
of the McDonnell Douglas standard.5 2  Justice VandeWalle's main criti-
cism was that the presumption created under the McDonnell Douglas
standard (via the prima facie case) could be too easily proven. Justice
VandeWalle asserted that the North Dakota Supreme Court should
instead develop its own standard for reviewing intentional discrimination
cases "onthe basis of [its] own jurisprudence."' Justice Levine disagreed
with Justice VandeWalle and argued that the "incorporation" of the
McDonnell Douglas formula was "useful" because of the "obvious similari-
ties" between the federal and state civil rights laws.'
Although it seemed clear that the court had adopted the McDonnell
Douglas standard,' it was not clear what the extent of a plaintiffs burden
would be in stage III because the court did not specify how it had inter-
preted this stage of the standard.57 With this question left unanswered,
the extent of the plaintiffs burden in stage III of the McDonnell Douglas
standard seemed as unresolved in North Dakota as it was among the fed-
eral circuits.
C. ST. MAr's HoNoR CENTER V HzcKs RESOLVES THE
FEDERAL CONTROVERSY OVER STAGE III
The United States Supreme Court, in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,58 resolved the controversy among the federal circuits over the
extent of a plaintiffs burden in stage III of the McDonnell Douglas stan-
52. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 195 (N.D. 1989) (VandeWalle, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. Justice VandeWalle argued that if North Dakota patterns its standard after a federal
standard, it should utilize the standard established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Id.
That standard, Justice VandeWalle stated, would require a plaintiff to show a "pattern... of failure to
hire qualified minority applicants" to create an inference of discrimination. Id. at 196 (emphasis
added). Justice VandeWalle asserted that "[w]ithout more, [he did] not believe the mere fact that a
minority applicant did not receive the position would raise such an inference." Id. (emphasis added).54. Id. at 196.
55. Id. at 197 (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Levine argued that
the court should only employ the McDonnell Douglas standard when it was useful to do so and not
"indiscriminately." Id. Justice Levine stated that "where federal law has ironed out some wrinkles,
we should take advantage of that experience .... [W]e are in the enviable position of incorporating
the wheat, while rejecting the chaff." Id.
56. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D. 1993) (stating the court's
belief that McDonnell Douglas had been adopted in Moses).
57. See Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 191-92 (N.D. 1989) (instructing the trial
court on what burdens the plaintiff anddefendant would have on remand). The court stated that, on
remand, "Moses will be free to show that any claimed reason was in fact a pretext." Id. The court's
use of "pretext" rather than "pretext for discrimination" does not necessarily signal the court's belief
that a plaintiff has only the burden of proving that the defendant's proffered reason was false.
Compare St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 n.6 1993) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1972) in recognizing that "pretext" in the employment
discrimination context means -'pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [law]'" (1972))
with Mister v. Illinois Co., 832 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1988)
(defining "pretext" as meaning only that the proffered reason is false).
58. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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dard.5" In Hicks, Melvin Hicks, an African-American,' was demoted and
later terminated by the St. Mary's Honor Center (St. Mary's). 6 ' Hicks
filed a Title VII-based disparate treatment claim against St. Mary's, alleg-
ing that he had been demoted and terminated because of his race. 62 The
district court, relying on the McDonnell Douglas standard,' ruled against
Hicks even though he had successfully discredited both of St. Mary's two
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons.64
The two reasons St. Mary's proffered for Hicks' dismissal were "the
severity and the accumulation of [rule] violations committed by
[Hicks]."6 Hicks subsequently (in stage III) proved that St. Mary's two
proffered reasons were false by showing that "others who committed
more serious violations either were not disciplined or were treated more
leniently." Although St. Mary's proffered reasons were discredited, the
district court was not convinced that St. Mary's unequal treatment of
Hicks was due to Hicks' race.67 The district court stated that Hicks had
failed to satisfy the "ultimate burden" of proving that his termination "was
racially rather than personally motivated" and therefore, ruled in favor of
St. Mary's.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's holding and ruled that Hicks had satisfied his "ultimate burden" of
persuasion when he proved that St. Mary's proffered reasons were false.69
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the presumption of discriminatory
intent cannot be rebutted by nondiscriminatory reasons that are ulti-
mately discredited.7' The court held that when a plaintiff successfully
discredits the employer's proffered reasons, the "plaintiff [is] entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."7
59. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2750 (1993).
60. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 n.1 (E.D.Mo. 1991), revd, 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
61. Id at 1245.
62. Id. at 1249. A plaintiff, in a discriminatory termination case, must show that the plaintiff:
"1). .. is within a protected... group ... ; 2) [t]hat he was... discharged; 3) [t]hat he was replaced
by a... person or persons outside the protected ... group; and 4) [t]hat he was qualified to do the
job." Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1009 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979). The district court found that
Hicks had "proved a prima facie case of race discrimination." Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1249. See also
Halsell v. Kimberly-Clar* Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983)
(employing the McDonnell Douglas standard to analyze claims brought pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
63. Id. at 1249.
64. Id. at 1252.
65. Id at 1250.
66. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), revd, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993).
67. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252.
68. Id at 1251-53.
69. Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492-93.
70. id.
71. Id. at 492.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
debate among the federal circuits concerning the plaintiffs burden during
stage III of the McDonnell Douglas standard.72 The Court stated that an
employer cannot be liable for "discriminatory employment practices
unless... an appropriate factfinder determines... that the employer has
unlawfully discriminated."73 The Court asserted that the plaintiffs bur-
den cannot be substituted with the "lesser" showing that the employer's
explanation for its employment action is false.74
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's rul-
ing75 and held that not only does a plaintiff in a disparate-treatment case
have the burden of proving that the employer's reason is false, but he or
she must also prove the "ultimate fact"-that the true reason for the
employment decision was discriminatory.76 The Court stated that when
the employer's proffered reasons are proven false, courts may "infer the
ultimate fact of ... discrimination" but are not compelled to do so as a
matter of law.77 The Court asserted that this holding is consistent with its
previous rulings concerning McDonnell Douglas78 and is in accordance
72. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748-50 (1993); see supra notes 36-42
and accompanying text (explaining the different interpretations of stage III of the McDonnell Douglas
standard).
73. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751 (emphasis in original).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2756.
76. Id. at 2747.
77. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
78. Id. The Court in Hicks stressed that despite the burden shifting under McDonnell Douglas,
"'[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."' Id. at 2753 (citation omitted). The Court
acknowledged that some "dicta" in Burdine may have caused confusion as to the extent of the
plaintiffs burden in stage III. Id. at 2752 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981)). The "dicta" in Burdine suggests that plaintiffs may satisfy their burden in stage III
"indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)) (citation omitted). The Court in
Hicks discredited this passage by noting that other language in Burdine stated that "'[tihe defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons."' Hicks, 113 S.
Ct. at 2749 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
The Hicks Court stated that any confusion caused by Burdine should have been expelled by the
Court's subsequent holding in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens. Hicks, 113 S.
Ct. at 2753 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)).
The Court in Aikens characterized the "dicta" from Burdine as meaning that "'the... court must
decide which party's explanation... it believes.'" Id. at 2754 (citing Aikens. 460 U.S. at, 714). The
Hicks Court asserted that the Aikens characterization dispelled any doubt created by Burdine by
confirming that "it is not enough.., to disbelieve the emp]oyer['s explanation.]" Id. (citing Aikens,
460 U.S. at 714 (emphasis in original).
The dissent in Hicks disputed the majority's interpretation of McDonnell Douglas' progeny. Id.
at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the Aikens Court confirmed that plaintiffs
need to only show that the employer's reasons are false by "favorably" quoting the inconsistent "dicta"
from Burdine. Id. (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714; Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1980)). The dissent further argued that the Aiken's characterization of
the Burdine passage, which directs courts "to 'decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes[,]" forbids the factfinder from considering any possible explanation that is not
offered by either party. Id. (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254); see Hicks v. St.
Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991) The district judge was not
convinced that the "crusade to terminate [Hicks] . . .was racially rather than personally motivated."
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with Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 79
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs presumptions
that are "not otherwise provided for by ... Congress .... ."8o The Hicks
Court reasoned that the presumption created in stage I of McDonnell
Douglas is "like" the presumptions that are directed by Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, because stage I shifts only the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant and does not relieve the plaintiff of the "ultimate
burden" of persuasion."' The Court opined that by requiring an accepta-
ble nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the presumption of discrimination,
the burden of persuasion would be effectively and incorrectly shifted onto
the employer to persuade the court that it did not discriminate against the
plaintiff.82 The Court stated that because the employer's burden of pro-
duction precedes the plaintiffs opportunity to disprove the reasons,s- the
presumption should be rebutted whenever an employer properly pro-
duces a nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of the persuasiveness of the
reason.84
In Hicks, the Court settled the controversy among the federal cir-
cuits by ruling that a plaintiff must discredit an employer's proffered
explanation and prove that the true motivation for the employment deci-
sion was discriminatory, in order to prove intentional discrimination.s 5 In
contrast, since Moses, the North Dakota Supreme Court had not revisited
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2766. The dissent asserted that it was therefore an error for the district court to
consider that Hicks was mistreated for "personal" reasons, because this possibility was never advanced
by St. Mar's. Id
79. Id at 2747; see FED. R. EVID. 301(dictating the treatment of civil presumptions).
80. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
99 (5th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993). Rule 301 dictates that:
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
hI
81. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
82. Id. at 2748-49. The dissent argued that a presumption created under the McDonnell
Douglas formula is not rebutted by discredited nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 2757.
83. Id at 2748.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2750.
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the extent of both parties' burdens in a disparate treatment claim s8 until
Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co.8 7
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In Schweigert, the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that its
application of the Human Rights Act is not bound by federal application
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.' However, the supreme court noted
that federal civil rights interpretations were a useful model after which to
pattern its analysis, "given the obvious parallels between" Title VII and
the Human Rights Act of North Dakota. 9 The court stated that it would
therefore follow the McDonnell Douglas standard only "when it is helpful
and sensible to do so ...."90
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hicks and highlighted its rationale
concerning Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.9' In Hicks, the
Court likened the presumption created under the McDonnell Douglas
standard to those presumptions governed by Rule 301 of the Federal
86. The North Dakota Supreme Court had addressed a claim of employment discrimination
since Moses, but the plaintiff was unable to advance this claim far enough or the supreme court to
review it under the McDonnell Douglas standard. See, e.g., Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins. Inc., 498
N.W.2d 174, 177 (1993) (opining that the Human Rights Act of North Dakota did not apply to the
employer because of the number of employees). In Swenson, a female employee alleged that she was
demoted by Northern Crop Insurance because of her gender. Id. At the time of the demotion, the
Human Rights Act only affected employers with ten or more employees. Id. Because Northern Crop
Insurance did not have a sufficient number of employees, Swenson was barred from seeking recovery
via the Human Rights Act. Id. at 178. The North Dakota State Legislature has since amended the
Human Rights Act to apply to all employers who employ "'one or more'" persons. Id. at 177 n.5
(quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(5) (1991)). For further information about Swenson, see
Angela M. Elsperger, Case Comment, Damages-Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Workplace: Dei ning Extrerne and Outrageous Conduct in North Dakota's Job Description, 70 N.D.
L. REv. 187 (1994).
87. 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
88. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D. 1993). Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act only preempts state anti-discrimination laws that conflict with the federal statutes.
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n. v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1963)
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7).
The Human Rights Act of North Dakota gives broader coverage than its federal counterpart in a
number of respects. For example, Title VII only covers employers that employ more than 15 workers
whereas under the Human Rights Act all employers that employ at least one worker are covered. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(5) (1991). Additionally, an injured party
faces simpler requirements to have a claim under the North Dakota law than under Title VII. Under
the North Dakota Human Rights Act, a party may file a claim immediately or within a three-year
period after the alleged discrimination. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-19 (1991). In contrast, Title VII
plaintiffs must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and allow the EEOC 180 days to investigate and reconcife the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a), (e)
(1988). After the 180 days has expired or the party has received a letter from the EEOC permitting
the party to sue, the party is allowed to file a claim in federal district court within a 90-day period.- Id.
at (0(1).
89. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D. 1993).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 228. See supra notes 75-84 (comparing the presumptions created under McDonnell
Douglas with those presumptions governed by Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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Rules of Evidence because in both cases, the created presumption shifts
only the burden of production.92
The North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out that the Hicks ration-
ale contradicts the principles of Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence. 3 The state evidentiary rule shifts the "burden of persuasion
... to rebut th[e] presumption[,]" whereas the federal evidentiary rule
shifts only the burden of production. 4 To make the McDonnell Douglas
standard conform with state evidentiary principles, the court announced
that the presumption created in stage I of the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard should be governed by North Dakota's evidentiary rule . 5 The result
of the court's alteration is a two-stage formula that combines principles of
both state and federal law. 6
In stage I, the new formula (the Schweigert standard) is identical to
that of the McDonnell Douglas standard in that "the plaintiff has the ini-
tial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of [intentional] discrimination."97 In stage II, the Schweigert stan-
92. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-49 (1993).
93. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
94. I& (emphasis added). Two theories have influenced evidentiary rules regarding
presumptions. GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTzBURC, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES Ch. 8 Rule 301, at 2 (1987). The Federal Rules of Evidence reflect
the theory known as the "bursting bubble" theory. Id. at 2. This theory provides that a presumption
has the effect of shifting the burden of production in order to rebut the presumed fact. Id. at 1. If
the party against whom the presumption exists produces contrary evidence, the presumption
disappears, thus, bursting the bubble. 2 JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, ET AL., ED., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 344, at 462 (4th ed. 1992).
The other theory, advocated by the Uniform Rules of Evidence, requires a burden of persuasion
to rebut the presumption. GRECORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURC, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA:
THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES Ch. 8 Rule 301, at 2 (1987). Under this theory, the
presumption does not immediately disappear upon the production of contrary evidence, but rather,
remains until the presumed fact is actually disproven. Id. at 3. Eleven states have adopted the
Uniform Rules/burden-of-production approach: North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
Nevada, Nebraska, Oregon, Utah, Arkansas, Delaware, and Maine. N.D. R. EVID.301; MONT. R.
EVID. 301 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (West 1993); Wyo. R. EVID. 301; NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 47.180 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-301 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.120
(1993); UTAH R. EVID. 301; ARK. R. EVD. 301; DEL. R. EVID. 301; ME. R. EVID. 301. Of the eleven
states, only North Dakota's supreme court has found that the McDonnell Douglas standard partially
conflicts with the state's evidentiay rules governing presumptions. See Hearing Aid Inst. v.
Rasmussen, 852 P.2d 628, 632 (Mont. 1993) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to review a state
case under Montana's employment discrimination law); Puetz Motor Sales, Inc. v. Labor and Indus.
Review Comm'n, 376 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Wis. App. 1985) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to
review a state claim under Wisconsin's employment discrimination law); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Scott, 439 N.W.2d 72, 74-75 (Neb. 1989) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to review a state-
based claim under Nebraska's employment discrimination law); University of Utah v. Industrial
Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1987) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to review a state-
based claim under Utah's employment discrimination law); Riner v. National Cash Register, 424
A.2d 669, 672-73 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to review a state-
based claim under Deleware's employment discrimination law); Maine Human Rights Comm'n v.
Dept. of Corrections, 474 A.2d 860, 866-67 (Me. 1984) (using the McDonnell Douglas standard to
review a state-based claim under Maine's employment discrimination law).
95. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
96. See id. (changing the McDonnell Douglas formula to compliment Rule 301 of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence).
97. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
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dard diverges from the McDonnell Douglas standard in that "the burden
of persuasion [rather than production] shifts to the employer to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that its action was motivated by ... nondiscriminatory reasons."98
Under the Schweigert standard, if the defendant is able to prove this fact,
the defendant prevails." Should the defendant fail to prove this fact, "the
plaintiff prevails."' °°
Applying the new standard, the supreme court found that Martin had
established her prima facie case to create a presumption that Provident
Life had discriminated against her.01 ' The court further ruled that the
district court had, in effect, found that Provident Life met their burden of
persuasion to rebut the presumption. 1' The employer's true motive is a
"pure question of fact," and accordingly, the supreme court reviewed the
district court's finding with a clearly erroneous standard.l1 3 The supreme
court concluded that even though the district court used an incorrect
standard to review the evidence, it did not commit clear error in its
findings. 10 4
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred with the result of the majority's
ruling, but objected to both stages of the majority's newly created
formula.' 5 Chief Justice VandeWalle reiterated the criticism of stage I
that he articulated in Moses'06-that the presumption under McDonnell
Douglas is too easily created.'0 7 He further argued that in stage II, the
"objectionable" presumption is aggravated by its combination with the




101. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229. Martin's prima facie case showing was not challenged by




105. id. at 232-33 (Vande Wale, C.J., concurring specially).
106. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 232.
107. Id.; Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 195 (N.D. 1989) (VandeWalle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id.; see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (explaining Chief Justice VandeWalle's
objection to the McDonnell Douglas standard andhis preference of the Batson standard). The Batson
standard was created in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985). The Batson standard is used to
analyze equal protection claims in cases in which an attorney uses peremptory challenges to exclude
certain classes of people as jurors. Id. The Batson standard was patterned after the McDonnell
Douglas standard. Id. at 94 n.18, 96-98.
Under Batson, the challenger proves a prima facie case by showing a pattern of juror strikes
against members of the protected class. Id. at 96-97. After the prima facie case is proven, the burden
oproduction shifts to the opponent who must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the jury
strikes. Id. at 97.
Interestingly, the supreme court's decision in Schweigert could conceivably affect the Batson
standard if the standard is employed to analyze a peremptory challenge claim based on equal
protection principles in the North Dakota Constitution. In City of Mandan v. Fern, the North
Dakota Supreme Court rejected a defendant's urging that equal protection provisions in Article I,
19941 219
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that this combination improperly favors plaintiffs far "beyond what the
[United States] Supreme Court . . . contemplated" in designing the
McDonnell Douglas standard.1' 9
IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Supreme Court's reexamination and ultimate
modification of the McDonnell Douglas standard in Schweigert was
prompted by the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Hicks con-
cerning Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hicks marked the
first time the United States Supreme Court extensively compared the pre-
sumption created in stage I of the McDonnell Douglas standard to those
presumptions governed by Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
It is ironic that the Hicks decision, which favored an interpretation that
makes the plaintiffs burden more onerous, gave the North Dakota
Supreme Court reason to reanalyze the McDonnell Douglas standard and
to ultimately modify it in a way that is more favorable to plaintiffs. Under
the Schweigert standard, a plaintiff does not bear the "ultimate burden" of
proving the employer's actual intent as a plaintiff does under McDonnell
Douglas.
This new standard did not affect the outcome of Jocelyn Martin's
claim because Provident Life was able to prove that they had not discrimi-
nated against her."' However, future North Dakota claimants with cir-
cumstances similar to those of Melvin Hicks, in St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks," 2 could now prevail.
Hypothetically, under the Schweigert standard, once Hicks had
proved his prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of persuasion
would have shifted to the employer to prove that it did not discriminate
against Hicks. Because the court did not believe St. Mary's nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for Hicks' termination, St. Mary's would have failed to
sections 21 and 22 of the North Dakota Constitution should be used to decide his challenge of the
state's peremptory challenges. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 n.3 (1993). The court
rejected the argument because Fern did not sufficiently substantiate this claim. Id. Should a
challenger successfully state an equal protection claim based on North Dakota Constitutional
principles, it would be logically consistent to assume that the court would modify the Batson standard
(in the same manner as it modified the McDonnell Douglas standard) to also reflect the principles of
Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. The result would be that after the challenger has
proven the prima facie case, the burden of persuasion (rather than production) would shift to the
state to prove that it had not acted with discriminatory motives.
109. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 233 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially).
110. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). The United States Supreme
Court has cited Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in prior cases, but did not extensively
analyze the rule in relation to the McDonnell Douglas standard until its decision in Hicks. See, e.g..
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1980) (citing Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence without significant analysis).
111. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
112. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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meet its burden of rebutting the presumption, and Hicks would have
prevailed.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hicks, which has
widely been criticized as making the plaintiffs burden too onerous,1 3
may give other states the occasion to reexamine their use of the McDon-
nell Douglas standard. States that desire a more plaintiff-friendly alterna-
tive may opt for a standard similar to the Schweigert standard.11 4
The supreme court in Schweigert clearly established the standard to
be used in disparate treatment claims pursuant to the Human Rights Act
of North Dakota. Future development of the Human Rights Act of North
Dakota will undoubtedly be influenced by federal interpretations of Title
VII as the court was in Schweigert. However, the North Dakota Supreme
113. EEOC Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court's 1993 Hicks Decision, [Oct. 1993]
Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 6-7 (Oct. 27, 1993). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is strongly criticizing the United States Supreme Court recent
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993)). The EEOC claims that this decision will unfairly burden plaintiffs who are trying to
proved employment discrimination. Id. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Labor, has introduced the Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act which would
overturn the Hicks decision and allow a plaintiff to prevail in a disparate-treatment case by proving a
prima facie case and "disproving the employer's explanation for its conduct." Bills Introduced in
Senate and House to Overturn Court's Ruling in Hicks, [Dec. 1993] Empl. Discrimination Rep.
(BNA) No. 1, at 200 (Dec. 15, 1993).
114. The states that are most likely to adopt the Schwelgert standard are Montana, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Wyoming, Oregon, Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Utah and Nevada. These states'
evidentiary rules are similar to North Dakota's in that a created presumption shifts the burden of
persuasion onto the defendant to disprove the presumed fact. See supra note 94 and accompanying
text (explaining the different types o" state evidentiary rules concerning presumptions).
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Court has made it clear that all future development of the Human Rights
Act of North Dakota will reflect principles of North Dakota law."
5
Nicholas W. Chase
115. The North Dakota Supreme Court may soon decide a case that could further define the
scope of the Human Rights Act in the area of age discrimination. Interview with the Honorable Kirk
Smith, North Dakota District Judge for the Northeast Central Judicial District, in Grand Forks,
North Dakota (Mar. 17, 1994). On September 27, 1993, Alan Schuhmacher and Dale Wavra
successfully proved in district court age discrimination as the motivation for their respective
discharges by the North Dakota Hospital Association (NDHA). Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp.
Ass'n, Civil No. 91351, Slip Op. at 1-3 (Feb. 18, 1994). One issue that was critical to the lower court's
decision was NDHA's argument that discharging an older and higher paid employee in favor of a
younger and lower paid employee to reduce payroll expenses should not be considered age
discrimination under the Human Rights Act of North Dakota. Defendant's Brief (Mem. Supp. Jury
Instructions) at 4-8, Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, Civil No. 91351 (Feb. 18, 1994).
This issue has been recently addressed on the federal level. The United States Supreme Court,
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggns, ruled that years of service and age were not synonomous; therefore, it
was not disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act for an employer to
discharge an employee so that the employee's pension would not vest. Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 113 S.
Ct. 1701, 1706-07 (1993). This ruling in Hazen Paper was interpreted by another federal court to
include replacing an older and higher paid employee with a younger and lower paid worker as not
being an intentional discrimination practice. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. MCIInt'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1473 (D.N.J. 1993)....
In Shuhrna her u. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, the NDHA argued that the district 
court should
adopt the federal philosophy concerning age discrimination in its application of the Human Rights
Act. Defendant's Brief (Mem. Supp. Jury Instructions) at 3-7, Schumacher v. North Dakota Hosp.
Ass'n, Civil No. 91351 (Feb. 18, 1994). The plaintiffs, citing Schweigert, urged the district court not
to adopt the federal philosophy but rather, follow the North Dakota Supreme Court's pattern of
allowing broader protection under the Human Rights Act than under federal counterparts. Plaintiffs
Brief (Mem. Supp. Jury Instructions) at 4-8, Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, Civil No.
91351 (Feb. 18, 1994).
The district court ruled that it would not follow the federal philosophy and instructed the jury
that employment decisions could not be based on an assessment of the higher relative wages of older
employees. Jury Instruction 12, Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, Civil No. 91351 (Sept.
27, 1993). The NDHA has filed a motion for a new trial, which is awaiting a hearing on May 9, 1994.
Interview with the Honorable Kirk Smith, North Dakota District Judge for the Northeast Central
Judicial District, in Grand Forks, North Dakota (Mar. 17, 1994).
